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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the effects of In ernational Monetary Fund (IMF) arrangements on 
the timing of inflation stabilization programs. Es entially, we test the hypothesis that 
IMF aid accelerates stabilization using probit and proportional hazards models. As in 
theoretical models, re ults are mixed: larger withdrawals of the amounts agreed to seem 
to hasten stabilization, but ther  is weak evidence that IMF arrangements lead to greater 
delays. Concerning other effects, greater fragmentation of the political system delays 
stabilization while higher inflation tends to hasten it. Other political and economic 
variables do not seem to have significant effects on th  timing of stabilizations. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper analyses the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
arrangements on the decision to implement stabilization programs in countries suffering 
from chronic inflation. Essentially, we test the hypothesis that IMF aid accelerates 
stabilization. By providing financial means that may allow the reduction of inflation 
without incurring politically unacceptable economic costs, foreign aid can hasten 
stabilization. But, since aid can also reduce the costs of inflation, it may eventually 
delay the necessary reforms. This is likely to happen when the most influential interest 
groups do not agree on the need for reform or on how it should be conducted. Thus, the 
effects of aid may depend on the timing of ts ann uncement a dits transfer. 
In this paper, the information available since the late 1950s on IMF 
arrangements with 10 countries that suffered from chronic inflation is used to construct 
a series of variables d cribing amounts agreed to and the timing of announcements and 
transfers. Several political and economic variables are also included in the estimations: 
degree of fragmentation of the political system, ideological orientation of the 
government, time in office, whether the political system is a democracy or a 
dictatorship, inflation rate, government budget balance, GDP growth, stock of foreign 
exchange reserves, etc. 
Probit and proportional hazards models are used to evaluate the effects of those 
explanatory variables on the probability of starting a stabilization program in a situation 
of high inflation. Results are mixed: although the percentage drawn of the amounts 
agreed to is positively related to the speed of implementation of a stabilization program, 
the existence of an arrangement with the IMF may delay it. The amounts agreed to and 
the duration of the arrangements do not seem to matter. As found in Veiga (2000), 
greater fragmentation of the political system delays stabilization while higher inflation 
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tends to hasten it. Other political and economic variables do not seem to have 
significant effects. 
 
2. Delayed Stabilization 
One intriguing fact that is common t  countries that have sufered from chronic 
inflation is that they followed unsustainable monetary and fiscal policies for long 
periods of time. Even when policymakers recognized that these policies were 
suboptimal, they tended to take too long to reverse them and implement the ecessary 
stabilization programs. 
Assuming an unreasonable degree of my pia or irrationality of policymakers is 
not a desirable way to explain delays, as it offer no constructive explanation of the 
phenomenon. Thus, one can either assume that he timing of stabilizations is the rational 
and deliberate choice of a policymaker maximizing a social welfare function, or that 
policy choices result from negotiations between contending interest groups and delays 
are caused by difficulty in reaching agreements. The rest of this section describes some 
of the models based on these assumptions.1 
 Orphanides (1996) presents a model in which the delay and abandonment of a 
stabilization program are possible decisions of a policymaker who tries to maximize a 
social welfare function. A program can be delayed when more favourable initial 
conditions are expected, or abandoned when the expected gains of reducing inflation are 
lower than stabilization costs. In this model, a more severe inflation is likely to hasten 
stabilization and, if a prospective reform is to be accomplished via the management of 
the exchange rate, the level of foreign reserves (subject to stochastic shocks) will be a 
                                         
1 For more complete descriptions of these models see Drazen (1996) and Veiga (2000). 
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critical factor. Thus, low levels of foreign reserves may result in delayed or abandoned 
stabilization programs. 
Alesina and Drazen (1991) present a political economy model in which delays 
of stabilizations result when two groups with conflicting interests do not agree on the 
distribution of the costs of stabilization. This “war of attrition” ends whe  one of the 
groups concedes, that is, accepts paying a higher proportion of the taxes needed to 
eliminate the deficit. In this model, one important factor leading to delays is the degree 
of political polarization among interest groups. Drazen and Grilli (1993) and Hsieh 
(2000) extend this model, emphasizing the possible benefits of adverse exogenous 
shocks or crises that may hasten stabilization. In this context, very high inflation results 
in higher costs of delaying stabilization, which should lead to its earlier implementation. 
Political instability and polarization are the key factors leading to an excessive 
use of seigniorage in the model of Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992). When 
incumbent policymakers face a small probability of re-election and have different 
preferences from the prospective winners, they are induced to delay reform and leave an 
inefficient tax system to their successors. Their empirical results show that countries 
with more unstable political systems tend to rely more on seigni age. 
 Interest groups are generally represented by political parties. Thus, fragmented 
political systems, generally with many parties represented in parliament, tend to be 
associated with a high degree of political polarization and instability.2 In the models 
discussed above, this would lead to greater delays of stabilizations.
 To the best of our knowledge, Veiga (2000) represents the only attempt at 
empirically testing these models. This paper identifies several testable hypotheses of the 
                                         
2 Mainwaring and Scully (1995, pp. 28-33) argue that the most polarized political systems in Latin 
America are also the most fragmented. 
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models explaining stabilization delays and tests them for 10 countries that suffered from 
chronic inflation. The main conclusions are that higher fragmentation of the political 
system leads to delays of stabilizations, while higher inflation hastens them. These 
results provide evidence in favour of Alesina and Drazen (1991), Cukierman, Edwards 
and Tabellini (1992), Drazen and Grilli (1993), and Hsieh (2000). Little or no evidence 
is found of political business cycles, partisan effects, or of Orphanides’ (1996) 
hypothesys that the timing of stabilization depends of the level of foreign reserves. 
In a different approach, that focuses on the results of implemented programs, 
Ball and Rausser (1995) investigate the effects of the key variables of the above-
mentioned models on the success of stabilization. They conclude that political 
repression is not effective, political instability is detrimental, severe crises enhance the 
political consensus needed for reform, and that IMF support can undermine the 
credibility of stabilization programs. 
 
3. The effects of foreign aid
The economics literature does not present a consensual view of the effects of 
external aid on the timing of stabilization. On one hand, the inflow of foreign currency 
will reduce the costs of stabilization and increase its probability of success, inducing 
policymakers to stabilize sooner. But, on the other hand, financial assistance also 
reduces the costs of living with high inflation, possibly leading to greater delays. 
 Orphanides (1996) analyzes the effects of external aid and conditionality in his 
model. When a program is already under way, aid can increase the willingness of the 
government to conclude it successfully. If the government is contemplating the 
implementation of a stabilization, then programs that would be optimally delayed may 
now start sooner, and programs that would start even without aid will now have a 
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greater probability of success or become less painful. The tradeoff between the 
probability of success and the cost of adjustment could then be a ratio ale for 
conditionality. Finally, the expectation of external aid in the future would lead to greater 
delays of stabilizations or to the abandonment of programs already under way. 
 Casella and Eichengreen (1996) introduce foreign aid into the Alesina and
Drazen (1991) model. Since they assume that aid is not extended instantaneously upon 
the advent of high inflation, its effects hinge precisely on the issue of timing. They find 
that aid that is agreed upon and announced early and dispensed rapidly ca  hasten 
stabilization, while aid offered late will have the opposite effect. In a “war of attrition” 
game, aid announced early accelerates the transmission of information, leading to an 
earlier concession by the loser, while aid that is announced late in the game will only 
serve to provide the interest groups with additional resources that allow them to keep 
fighting for a longer period of time. Furthermore, long intervals between the 
announcement and the disbursement of aid will tend to increase delays. This happens 
because the announcement of aid provides an incentive to postpone concessions until 
financial assistance arrives. The greater the amount of the transfer, the more important it 
is to get the timing right. They conclude that only aid that is deci ed and transferred 
early enough will surely increase welfare in the receiving country. 
 Hsieh (2000) also analyzes the effects of foreign aid in a framework similar to 
that of Alesina and Drazen (1991). He concludes that foreign aid is counterproductive 
because, by reducing the costs of further delay, it will decrease the probability of an 
agreement. 
 According to Dornbusch, Sturzenegger and Wolf (1990), external support can 
contribute to the credibility of a program in two ways. First, external parties can 
monitor the execution of the program when conditionality is imposed. Second, the 
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foreign exchange transferred will increase the probability of success of exchange rate 
based stabilizations. Although they claim that the effectiveness of external aid is still an 
open issue, they conclude that it critically eases the adjustment. Thus, by decreasing the 
costs of stabilization, external support leads to its earlier implementation. 
 Although conditionality increases the credibility and reduces the delays of 
stabilizations in the above models, Rodrik (1989) developed an imperfect information 
model in which conditional assistance from international financial institutions can 
undermine the credibility of reforms or stabilizations. He considers a framework in 
which economic agents are unable to distinguish between a truly reform-minded 
government and one that may reform just to secure the much desired foreign assistance. 
In such case, the simple announcement of reform is not informative. This means that the 
reform-minded government will have to go much further in order to reveal its true type 
and secure some credibility for the stabilization. The increased costs of stabilization 
may eventually lead to greater delays of credible stabilizations.3 
 Dreher and Vaubel (2001) argue that IMF lending causes moral hazard and 
political business cycles. With respect to the former, they find that money growth and 
budget deficits are higher the less a country has exhausted its borrowing potential in the 
IMF and the more credit it has received from it. Thus, IMF support will not help 
inflation stabilization. The IMF generates political business cycles by conceding more 
credits in the democratic recipient countries in pre-election and post-election years. 
                                         
3 Empirical results obtained by Ball and Rausser (1995) do not offer a final conclusion regarding the 
effect of foreign assistance on the credibility and ultimate success of stabilization programs. Nevertheless, 
they find weak evidence that countries receiving IMF support tend to have greater difficulty stabilizing.
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4. The Data 
The dataset is comp sed of quarterly data from the first quarter of 1957 to the 
fourth quarter of 1999, for 10 countries that experienced chronic inflation and 
implemented stabilization programs some time in this period. The 27 stabilization plans 
considered are listed in Table 1, which also indicates the quarter of implementation, the 
type, and the number of consecutive quarters of high inflation that preceded each
stabilization. 
 
<< Insert Table 1 around here >> 
 
The first major issue to solve when constructing the dataset was to determine 
when a stabilization program had been implemented. The method consisted in searching 
the economics literature for information on the starting dates of important stabilizations 
undertaken in countries suffering from ch onic inflation.4 The second issue was to 
determine when inflation was “high”, that is, when a stabilization program was clearly 
necessary. Inflation was considered high when it was over twice the average inflation 
rate of the last 10 years (and above 25%) or greater than or equal to 100%. 
The list of IMF arrangements with the 10 countries included in the sample is 
presented in Table 2, and the variables used in the estimations shown in this paper are 
described in Table 3. The remaining variables, those at were never or seldom 
statistically significant, are listed in Table 4. Since quarterly data are not always 
available for some of the countries studied, straight-line interpolation was used to 
generate quarterly data. The variables for which interpolation was used are real GDP 
                                         
4 The major references were: Bruno, et al. (1988), Bruno, et al. (1991), Calvo and Végh (1999), 
Hoffmaister and Végh (1996), Kiguel and Leviatan (1992), Pastor (1992), and Végh (1992). 
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growth and Fiscal Balance as a percentage of the GDP. Even after interpolating annual 
data for these variables there are still a few missing values. 
 
<< Insert Tables 2, 3 and 4 around here >> 
 
5. Empirical Evidence 
 In this section, probit and proportional hazards models are used to evaluate the 
effects of a number of variables on the probability of starting an inflation stabilization 
program, in a situation of high inflation. Each inflation spell contains all the consecutive 
quarters of high inflation, until a stabilization plan was implemented or inflation simply 
ceased to be high. For each quarter and inflation spell the dependent variable (STAB) 
takes the value of one if a stabilization plan was implemented in that quarter, and zero 
otherwise. If no stabilization is implemented, STAB takes the value of zero for all the 
observations in that inflation spell. The explanatory variables are related to the 
countries’ political systems, macroeconomic fundamentals, and arrangements of 
financial assistance from the IMF. 
I start by assuming that the conditional probability that a stabilization program is 
implemented at time t given that it has not been implemented before (the hazard rate)  
depends only on the explanatory variables. It does not change autonomously over time 
and any variation must be due to the independent variables. The explanatory variables 
used in the estimations whose results are shown in the paper include:
- Frag=1 and Frag=2: dummies for the fragmentation of the political system; 
- Ln(Inf): log of growth in CPI since the same quarter of the previous year; 
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- Control variables not directly related to the models described above: 
- FB/GDP: Fiscal Balance as a percentage of GDP; 
- GDP: real GDP growth since same quarter of previous year; 
- Several variables related to arrangements with the IMF; 
- Country dummies, in order to control for fixed effects. 
These variables are described in Table 3. The macroeconomic variables were lagged 
because the start of a stabilization program could affect their contemporaneous values. 
 Table 5 shows the results of he five most representative estimations of the 
probit model that we performed. Since the estimated coefficients are not easily 
interpretable, the marginal effects of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable, STAB, are also reported. They are the effects of one-unit changes in the 
explanatory variables on the probability of starting a stabilization program (expressed in 
percentage points) evaluated at the mean of the data. For dummy variables, they 
correspond to the change in probability when the dummy changes from 0 to 1. T-
statistics for the null of no effect and the significance levels at which the null 
hypotheses are rejected are also reported.
 
<< Insert Table 5 about here >> 
 
 Results clearly support the hypothesis that a lower fragmentation of the political 
system increases the probability of starting a stabilization program (reduces delays). 
Frag=1 and Frag=2 are always statistically significant and the estimated coefficients 
have the expected signs. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient of Frag=1 is always 
greater than that of Frag=2, as expected. This also indicates that authoritarian regimes 
that did not allow political parties tend to stabilize faster. Since the most fragmented 
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political systems are generally the most unstable and polarized, these results clearly 
support the conclusions of the political conflict models of Alesina and Drazen (1991) 
and Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992).5
The first lag of the natural logarithm of inflation, Ln(Inf(-1)), is statistically 
significant and has a positive coefficient in three estimations, providing weak support 
for the benefit of crises models f Drazen and Grilli (1993) and Hsieh (2000). That is, 
stabilization tends to be implemented sooner as inflation gets higher. As for the control 
variables, FB/GDP(-1) is not statistically significant in the estimations shown, and 
GDP(-1) has the expected sign but is statistically significant only in three estimations. 
Thus, the fiscal balance do s not seem to have much effect on the timing of 
stabilizations, while faster GDP growth may hasten stabilization. 
Some variables related to IMF arrangements were tried, with those that usually 
turned out as statistically significant being described in Table 3 and included in the 
estimations shown in Table 5. The percentage of the amount agreed upon with the IMF 
that was drawn in a given quarter (%Drawn) is marginally statistically significant in 
three estimations a d has a positive sign, as expected. This implies that transferring a 
large part of what was promised to a given country tends to hasten stabilization. But, 
many other variables related to the amount agreed or drawn (described in Table 4) were 
never or seldom statistically significant when included in the same regressions.6 Thu , 
the evidence for an effect of the amounts agreed or drawn on the timing of stabilizations 
is relatively weak. 
                                         
5 The other political variables mentioned in Table 2 were not statistically significant when included in the 
estimations. Thus, there is no support for the hypothesis that authoritarian regimes in general stabilize 
faster, for partisan effects, and for political business cycles. 
6 These and other results not rep rted in this paper are available from the author upon request.
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An interesting result is that the existence of an arrangement with the IMF during 
the current inflation spell e ms to increase delays: IMFp_inf is statistically significant 
and has a negative sign. When this dummy variable is equal to 1 (in the entire inflation 
spell), the probability of starting a stabilization in a given quarter is reduced by 7,45 
percentage points (see column 1). Ap25_inf is statistically significant and has a negative 
sign. This means that the probability of starting a stabilization program also decreases 
when at least 25% of the amount agreed is drawn during the current inflation spell. 
These results are in line with Hsieh (2000) that argues that foreign aid is 
counterproductive. But, IMFp_infq and AP25_infq, which are equal to one if the IMF 
arrangement or the withdrawal occurred in the same quarter or in previous quarters of 
the current inflation spell (see Table 4), are never statistically significant. Furthermore, 
several other variables related to the existence or the start of an IMF program in a given 
quarter or time interval (also described in Table 4), are not statistically significant. Thus, 
there is at most weak evidence that the existence of an IMF arrangement increases 
delays. 
Contrary to our expectations, the probability of starting a stabilization increases 
with the time that goes from the start of an IMF arrangement to the implementation of a 
stabilization. Time_IMFp_stab is statistically significant and has a positive sign. The 
same happens with T me_ap25_stab, which gives the number of quarters since at least 
25% of the amount agreed was drawn until a stabilization program was implemented. 
These results indicate that countries do not tend to stabilize as soon as they reach 
agreement with the IMF or draw 25% of the amount agreed. 
The time that goes from the onset of high inflation to the start of an IMF 
arrangement or the withdrawal of 25% of the amount agreed (Time_inf_IMFp and 
Time_inf_ap25) do not seem to matter. The same can be said about the time elapsed 
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between the start of an IMF arrangement and the withdrawal of 25% of the amount 
agreed (Time_IMFp_ap25). These results (not shown here) are not in line with the 
model of Casella and Eichengreen (1996) that attributes great importance to the timing 
of the announcement and transfer of financial assistance. 
Finally, the longer the number of consecutive quarters of high inflation, the 
greater is the probability of starting a stabilization program: Dur_inf is statistically 
significant and has a positive sign. Since the accumulated costs of high inflation grow 
with the passage of time, some interest groups will eventually reach the point when
costs of conceding are lower than those of living with high inflation, as predicted in the 
Alesina and Drazen (1991) “war of attrition” model. 
Table 6 shows the results when only Exchange Rate Based Stabilizations are 
considered. Given the very important role of external reserves in this type of programs, 
it is possible that financial assistance from the IMF becomes more important. The main 
differences in comparing Tables 5 and 6 is that Ln(Inf) is no longer statistically 
significant, total reseves as a percentage of imports (TR/Imp) is significant in three 
estimations,7 and %Drawn is now highly statistically significant. In sum, when only 
exchange rate based stabilizations are considered, the benefit of crises model of Drazen 
and Grilli (1993) and Hsieh (2000) receives less empirical support, Orphanides’s (1996) 
model receives weak support, as our proxy for the stock of reserves (TR/Imp) becomes 
statistically significant in some estimations, and the other conclusions remain essentially 
the same. 
 
                                         
7 It should be mentioned that this variable is never statistically significant in the estimations for all 27 
stabilizations (21 ERBS + 6 MBS). That is why it was excluded from the estimations shown in ables 5, 7 
and 8. 
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<< Insert Table 6 around here >> 
 
A considerable number of robustness tests not reported here was perfo med. 
First, quarterly growth of CPI was used instead of growth of CPI since the same quarter 
of the previous year. Second, growth of money since the same quarter of the previous 
year was used instead of growth of the CPI. Third, current account balance as a 
percentage of GDP, growth in exports, and growth in imports were added to the list of 
explanatory variables, either one at a time or together. Finaly, alternative definitions of 
high inflation were used. The main conclusions of the analysis are unchanged in these 
alternative estimations. 
 
Probit with time dummies 
 As shown in tables 5 and 6, the probability of starting a stabilization plan is also 
affected by the duration of high inflation: Dur_i fis statistically significant and has a 
positive sign, indicating that the probability of starting a stabilization program tends to 
increase with the number of consecutive quarters of high inflation.  
The possibility that the passage of time affects the hazard rate can also be 
incorporated into the probit model by including a set of dummy variables accounting for 
the duration of high inflation in the set of explanatory variables.8 In the pr ent case, six 
year dummies were created and five were included in the list of independent variables.9 
                                         
8 See Allison (1982) for an example with a Logit model. He also compares the results of two Logit 
models, with one assuming that the hazard rate does not change autonomously over time, and the other 
relaxing that constraint by adding year dummies to the list of regressors. 
9 Since the data set is composed of quarterly data, the inclusion of quarterly dummies reflecting the 
duration of high inflation before stabilization would be ideal, but that was not possible because for many 
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 Results are shown in Table 7.10 They are very similar to those of Table 4, with 
the exception that %Drawn becomes more significant. Thus, the main conclusions 
remain the same when we account for time effects by including year dummies in the 
estimated models. 
 
<< Insert Table 7 around here >> 
 
Proportional hazards model11 
 While a probit model has the advantage of being easily estimated by most of the 
statistical software packages available, it might not be the most correct model to apply 
in the present case. Estimated coefficients are not necessarily the discrete-time 
equivalent of the underlying continuous- me model and the coefficient vector is not 
invariant to the length of the time intervals, meaning that the choice of quart rly data 
(instead of monthly or annual data) may ffect estimated coefficients. 
 Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) developed a discrete-time version of the 
proportional hazards model that does not suffer from th  problems of the probit noted
above. It is expressed as follows: 
                                                                                                                 
quarters there were no stabilizations being implemented. This means that the dummies for these quarters 
would completely predict the value of the dependent variable (STAB=0). Thus, six yearly dummies were 
created instead: 5 for the first five years of high inflation before a stabilization program started, and a 6th 
for all the remaining years. The creation of additional year dummies was not possible because these 
would totally predict the value of the dependent variable. 
10 Since the variable Dur_inf was excluded from the set of regressors, only the results of four estimations 
are shown in Table 7. 
11 For descriptions of the proportional hazards model, see: Prentice and Gloeckler (1978), Allison (1982), 
and Jenkins (1995). 
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 ( )[ ]P xit t it= - - +1 exp exp 'a b , (1) 
where Pit is the probability that e inflation stabilization program i is i plemented at 
time t, at is an unspecified function of time, xit is a vector f time-dependent variables 
(covariates), and b is a vector of parameters which is unknown. In this model, the 
discrete-time estimated coefficients are also estimates of the underlying continuous-t me 
model and the coefficient vector is invariant to the leg h of th  time interval. 
 The estimation results obtained using the proportional hazards model are shown 
in Table 8. They are similar to those of the probit model with year dummies, but the 
levels of statistical significance are generally lower. The main differences occur in the 
first and fourth estimations, where GDP(-1) becomes ignificant, and in the third 
estimation, where FB/GDP(-1) is marginally significant. Nevertheless, the conclusions 
regarding the support for the testable hypotheses remain sentially the same. 
 
<< Insert Table 8 around here >> 
 
6. Conclusions 
The empirical nalysis of the effects of IMF financial assistance on the timing of 
stabilizations does not provide clear evidence for the hypothesis that aid accelerates 
stabilization. Although he higher the percentage drawn of the amounts agreed to the 
sooner stabilization will be implemented, several other variables related to the amounts 
agreed to or drawn are never or seldom statistically significant. Furthermore, the 
existence of an IMF arrangement during the inflation spell seems to reduce the 
probability of starting a stabilization program, supporting Hsieh’s, 2000 conclusions. 
Also contrary to what was expected, a longer period of time between the start of an IMF 
arrangement (or the withdrawal of 25% of the amount agreed) t n s to increase that 
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probability. Thus, there is no clear evidence that IMF assistance hastens stabilizations, 
nor for the effects of the timing of the arrangements predicted in the model of Casella 
and Eichengreen (1996). Obviously, more work is needed in this field. A natural 
shortcoming of empirical studies like the present one is that it is practically impossible 
to obtain data on expectations regarding the timing and amounts of foreign aid, which 
are important elemnts of the models described in section 3.
Results regarding testable hypotheses of the models of delayed stabilizations 
presented insection 2 are clearer. The hypothesis that higher fragmentation of the 
political system leads to delays of stabilizations is supported by the results of probit and 
proportional hazards models. Since the fragmentation of the political system is 
generally associated withpolitical instability and polarization, there is evidence in 
favour of the political conflict models of Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Cukierman, 
Edwards, and Tabellini (1992). There is also some support for the hypothesis that higher 
inflation hastens stabilizations, as suggested by Drazen and Grilli (1993), Orphanides 
(1996), and Hsieh (2000). Finally, Orphanides’ (1996) hypothesis that the decision t  
implement a stabilization program is essentially based on the available amount of 
foreign reserves receives weak support when only the 21 exchange rate based 
stabilizations are included in the sample. When all 27 stabilizations are considered, the 
stock of reserves does not affect the probability to implement a stabilization program. 
 In sum, financial assistance from the IMF may not matter much for the timing of 
inflation stabilization programs. Actually, empirical results suggest that the structure of 
the political system may play a more important role. In more fragmented political 
systems, usually the most unstable and polarized, conflicts of interests between political 
parties make the approval of new legislation harder and stabilization programs are often 
delayed until a serious crisis sets in, regardless of whether financial assistance is 
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received or not. Thus, as suggested by political conflict models, the structure of the 
political system may help explain why suboptimal policies are kept for long periods of 
time and the necessary corrective actions are not taken. 
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Table 1: Stabilization Programs 
 
Country Program dates 
and names 
Type Duration of “high” 
inflation until 
stabilization (quarters) 
Argentina 1959.3 ERBS 4 
 1967.2 ERBS 0 
 1973.3 ERBS 6 
 1978.4 (Tablita) ERBS 15 
 1985.2 (Austral) ERBS 15 
 1990.1 (Bonex) MBS 11 
 1991.2 (Convertibility) ERBS 1 
Bolivia 1985.3 ERBS 14 
Brazil 1964:2 ERBS 4 
 1986:1 (Cruzado) ERBS 25 
 1990.2 (Collor) MBS 13 
 1994.3 (Real) ERBS 14 
Chile 1975.2 MBS 11 
 1978.1 (Tablita) ERBS 0 
Dominican Republic 1985.2 ERBS 4 
 1990.3 MBS 11 
Israel 1985.3 (Shekel) ERBS 31 
Mexico 1976.4 ERBS 0 
 1988.1 ERBS 8 
Peru 1981.3 ERBS 24 
 1985.4 ERBS 10 
 1990.3 MBS 11 
Turkey 1980.1 ERBS 10 
Uruguay 1960.4 MBS 7 
 1968.2 ERBS 11 
 1978.4 (Tablita) ERBS 0 
 1990.4 ERBS 2 
Sources: Bruno, et al. (1988), Bruno, et al. (1991), Calvo and Végh (1999), 
Hoffmaister and Végh (1996), Kiguel and Leviatan (1992), Pastor 
(1992), and Végh (1992). 
Notes:  ERBS = Exchange Rate Based Stabilization (21 in this sample); 
 MBS = Money Based Stabilization (6 in this sample). 
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Table 2: IMF arrangements 
Country Month and year of IMF arrangements 
Argentina: 
16 SB 
2 EFF 
12/58-12/59; 12/59-12/60; 12/60-12/61; 12/61-05/62; 06/62-10/63; 05/67-04/68; 
04/68-04/69; 08/76-08/77; 09/77-09/78; 01/83-04/84; 12/84-05/86; 07/87-09/88; 
11/89-03/91; 07/91-03/92; 03/92-03/96(EFF); 04/96-01/98; 02/98-03/00 (EFF); 
03/00-03/03 
Bolivia: 
14 SB 
1 SAF, 2 ESAF 
1 PRGF 
11/56-12/57; 12/57-02/59; 05/59-09/60; 07/61-07/62; 08/62-08/63; 09/63-08/64; 
09/64-08/65; 09/65-11/66; 12/66-12/67; 12/67-01/69; 01/69-01/70; 01/73-01/74; 
02/80-01/81; 06/86-06/87; 12/86-07/88 (SAF); 07/88-05/94 (ESAF); 
12/94-09/98 (ESAF); 09/98-09/01(PRGF) 
Brazil: 
14 SB 
1 EFF 
06/58-06/59; 05/61-05/62; 01/65-01/66; 02/66-01/67; 02/67-02/68; 04/68-04/69; 
04/69-02/70; 02/70-02/71; 02/71-02/72; 03/72-03/73; 03/83-02/86 (EFF);  
08/88-02/90; 01/92-08/93; 12/98-12/01 
Chile: 
15 SB 
1 EFF 
04/56-03/58; 04/58-03/59; 04/59-12/59; 02/61-02/62; 02/62-02/63; 01/63-01/64; 
02/64-01/65; 01/65-01/66; 03/66-02/67; 03/68-02/69; 04/69-04/70; 01/74-01/75; 
03/75-03/76; 01/83-01/85; 08/85-08/89 (EFF); 11/89-11/90 
Dom. Republic: 
5 SB, 1 EFF 
12/59-12/60; 08/64-07/65; 01/83-01/85 (EFF); 04/85-04/86; 08/91-03/93; 
07/93-03/94 
Israel:   3 SB 11/74-02/75; 02/75-02/76; 10/76-10/77 
Mexico: 
5 SB, 3 EFF 
03/59-09/59; 07/61-07/62; 01/77-12/79 (EFF); 01/83-12/85 (EFF); 11/86-04988; 
05/89-05/93 (EFF); 02/95-02/97; 07/99-11/00 
Peru: 
17 SB 
4 EFF 
02/54-02/58; 02/58-02/59; 03/59-02/60; 03/60-02/61; 03/61-02/62; 03/62-02/63; 
03/63-02/64; 03/64-02/65; 04/65-03/66; /03/66-03/67; 08/67-08/68; 11/68-11/69 
04/70-04/71; 11/77-09/78; 09/78-08/1979; 08/79-07/1980; 06/82-04/1984 (EFF); 
04/84-07/85; 03/93-03/1996 (EFF); 07/96-03/99 (EFF); 06/99-05/02 (EFF) 
Turkey: 
17 SB 
01/61-12/61; 03/62-12/62; 02/63-12/63; 02/64-12/64; 02/65-12/65; 02/66-12/66; 
02/67-12/67; 04/68-12/68; 07/69-06/70; 08/70-08/71; 04/78-07/79; 07/79-06/80; 
06/80-06/83; 06/83-03/84; 04/84-04/85; 07/94-03/96; 12/99-12/2002 
Uruguay: 
20 SB 
06/61-06/62; 10/62-10/63; 06/66-06/67; 03/68-02/69; 05/70-05/71; 06/72-06/73; 
05/75-05/76; 08/76-08/77; 09/77-09/78; 03/79-03/80; 05/80-05/81; 07/81-07/82; 
04/83-04/85; 09/85-03/87; 12/90-03/92; 07/92-06/93; 03/96-03/97; 06/97-03/99; 
03/99-03/00; 05/00-03/2002 
Sources: IMF, IMF Annual Report, several issues, and http://www.imf.org. 
Notes:  When the IMF program is not a stand-by, the facility used is indicated between 
parentheses. The abbreviations used are the following: 
SB = Stand-by; EFF = Extended Fund Facility; SAF = Structural Adjustment Facility;  
ESAF = Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility; 
PRGF = Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
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Table 3: Description of the main Variables Used and Respective Sources 
Political variables: 
Dummies for the degree of fragmentation of the political system: 
Frag = 1 No parties allowed or exclusive one-party systems; 
Frag = 2 One-party majority parliamentary government; or pr sidential government, with 
the same party in control of the parliament (with an overall majority); 
Frag > 2 More fragmented political systems. 
Type = 1 for a military dictatorship or authoritarian government, and =0 for a democracy. 
Orient - Political orientation of the government: 
1 conservative, antilabor or antileft government; 
2 center- ight government or coalition of center-right and center-l ft parties; 
3 center-left government; 
4 socialist or populist government. 
Right =1 if (Orient=1 or Orient=2), and =0 otherwise. 
QLCH -  Quarters since last change in government or election 
Economic variables: 
Ln(Inf) – Natural log ofgrowth of CPI since the same quarter of the previous year 
FB/GDP - Fiscal Balance (Government Budget Balance) as a percentage of GDP 
GDP - Growth of real GDP since the same quarter of the previous year 
TR/Imp - Total Reserves as a percentage of Imports 
%Drawn - Percentage drawn of the amount agreed in the current IMF arrangement 
IMFp_inf = 1 there is an arrangement with IMF during the current inflation spell, and =0 otherwise 
Ap25_inf = 1 if during the current period of high inflation at least 25% of the total amount agreed is 
drawn, and =0 otherwise 
Time_IMFp_stab – quarters from the start of the first IMF program in that inflation spell until 
stabilization 
Time_ap25_stab - quarters ince when at least 25% of the total amount agreed has been drawn  
until stabilization 
Dur_inf – number of quarters since the onset of high inflation (duration of high inflation) 
Sources:  
- Political variables: Banks A. ed., Political Handbook of the World, several issues; Gorvin 
(1989); McDonald and Ruhl (1989); Mainwaring and Scully (1995); World Europa 
Yearbook, several issues. 
- Economic variables: International Financial Statistics - IMF. Quarterly data on Real GDP was 
also obtained from IBGE (Brazil), INEGI (Mexico), and Végh (1992), for Chile (1977:1 to 
1979:4) and Uruguay (1978:1 to 1983:4). Data on the imi g of IMF arrangements was 
obtained from the IMF Annual Report and on the IMF web page. 
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Table 4: Other Variables related to IMF arrangements 
TA_tr – Total amount agreed as a percentage of total reserves minus gold  
TFC - Total IMF credit and loans outstanding 
Drawn/tr - Amount drawn as a percentage of total reserves minus gold 
Drawn/yvar_tr - Amount drawn as a percentage of the yearly variation in total reserves 
Drawn/ca - Amount drawn as a percentage of the current account bal n e 
Drawn/finob - Amount drawn as a percentage of the Overall Balance financing 
Apdrawn - Accumulated percentage of the amount agreed hat was drawn. 
Ap25 = 1 if at least 25% of the total amount agreed has been drawn, a d =0 otherwise 
Ap50 = 1 if at least 50% of the total amount agreed has been drawn, a d =0 otherwise 
Ap75 = 1 if at least 75% of the total amount agreed has been drawn, a d =0 otherwise 
Apdrawn0 =1 when less than 25% of the total amount agreed has been drawn, and =0otherwise. 
Apdrawn25 =1 when the percentage of the total amount agreed that was drawn in between 25% a d 
50%, and =0 otherwise 
Apdrawn50 =1 when the percentage of the total amount agreed that was drawn in between 50%a d 
75%, and =0 otherwise 
Apdrawn75 =1 when more than 75% of the total amount agreed has been drawn, and =0otherwise 
IMFprogram = 1 if there was an IMF arrangement in the same year, and =0 otherwise
IMFp4 = 1 if there was an IMF arrangement in that quarter or in one of the four previous quarters, 
and 0 otherwise 
IMFp4 = 1 if there was an IMF arrangement in that quarter or in one of the four following quarters, 
and 0 otherwise 
IMFp8 = 1 if there was an IMF arrangement in that quarter or in one of the four previous quarters 
or in one of the four following quarters, nd 0 otherwise 
Dur_prog - Duration of the IMF program. Number of quarters from start to finish 
Time_last - Number of quarters since the end of the last IMF program 
Time_next - Number of quarters until the start of the next IMF program 
IMFp_start = 1 if an arrangement with IMF begins in that quarter, and =0 otherwise 
IMFp_start4 = 1 if an arrangement with IMF begins in that quarter or in ny of the four previous 
quarters, and =0 otherwise 
IMFp_start4p = 1 if an arrangement with IMF begins in that quarter or in ny of thefour following 
quarters, and =0 otherwise 
IMFp_start8 = 1 if an arrangement with IMF begins in that quarter, in any of the four previous 
quarters or in a y of the four following quarters, and =0 otherwise 
FA = 1 if the country has an arrangement of any kind with the IMF in that quarter, =0 otherwise 
Standby = 1 if the country has a St nd-By arrangement with the IMF in that quarter, =0 otherwise 
Eff =1 if the country has an Extended Fund Facility in that quarter, and =0 otherwise 
Imfp_infq = 1 if there is an IMF arrangement in that quarter or in previous quarters of the current 
inflation spell, and =0 otherwise 
Ap25_infq = 1 if the country has drawn at least 25% of the total amount greed up to that quarter or 
up to previous quarters of the current period of high inflation, and =0 otherwise  
Time_inf_IMFp - quarters from the beginning of high inflation to he start of an IMF program 
Time_inf_ap25 - quarters from the beginning of high inflation to when at least 25% of the total 
amount agreed has been drawn 
Time_IMFp_ap25 - quarters from the start of an IMF program to when at least 25% of the amount 
agreed has been drawn 
Sources: see the description at the bottom of Table 3. 
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Table 5: Probability of Starting a Stabilization Program 
 1 2 3 4 5 
      Frag = 1 1.188 
(2.46)** 
[15.03] 
1.391 
(2.66)*** 
[17.34] 
1.494 
(2.69)*** 
[16.07] 
1.301 
(2.36)** 
[13.53] 
1.367 
(2.58)*** 
[16.29] 
      Frag = 2 .908 
(2.41)** 
[11.49] 
1.153 
(2.73)*** 
[14.38] 
.982 
(2.25)** 
[10.56] 
1.008 
(2.29)** 
[10.49] 
.981 
(2.40)** 
[11.69] 
      Ln(Inf) (-1) .419 
(3.78)*** 
[5.31] 
.382 
(3.37)*** 
[4.76] 
.154 
(1.13) 
[1.66] 
-.022 
(-.14) 
[-.23] 
.350 
(2.92)*** 
[4.17] 
      FB/GDP (-1) .023 
(.69) 
[.299] 
-.003 
(-.08) 
[-.041] 
.003 
(.09) 
[.038] 
-.006 
(-.17) 
[-.072] 
.028 
(.75) 
[.339] 
      GDP (-1) .058 
(2.15)** 
[.737] 
.054 
(1.97)** 
[.683] 
.056 
(1.60) 
[.609] 
.059 
(1.63) 
[.621] 
.050 
(1.72)* 
[.607] 
      %Drawn .017 
(1.62)* 
[.246] 
.019 
(1.77)* 
[.242] 
.016 
(1.39) 
[.176] 
.023 
(1.89)* 
[.245] 
.016 
(1.51) 
[.201] 
      IMFp_inf -.589 
(-1.82)* 
[-7.45] 
  
 
 
 
 
 
-.845 
(-2.39)** 
[-10.07] 
      Ap25_inf  
 
 
-.765 
(-2.41)** 
[-9.54] 
   
      Time_IMFp_stab  
 
 
 
 
 
.213 
(4.66)*** 
[2.29] 
 
 
 
 
      Time_ap25_ stab   
 
 
 
 
 
.271 
(4.97)*** 
[2.82] 
 
 
 
      Dur_inf  
 
 
  
 
 
 .080 
(3.15)*** 
[.963] 
            Log Likelihood -72.69 -71.26 -60.00 -57.51 -67.21 
      McFadden R2 .11 .12 .20 .22 .15 
      Observations 308 308 308 308 308 
      
Sources: see Table 3.
Notes: - t-statistics are in parentheses;  
- the marginal effects of the independent variables on the probability of starting a 
stabilization are in brackets; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- models estimated with a constant and 9 country dummies, by Maximum Likelihood. 
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Table 6: Results for Exchange Rate Based Stabilizations 
 1 2 3 4 5 
      Frag = 1 1.105 
(2.21)** 
[11.57] 
1.386 
(2.55)** 
[13.99] 
1.255 
(2.28)** 
[11.87] 
1.075 
(1.99)** 
[10.00] 
1.164 
(2.23)** 
[11.80] 
      Frag = 2 .972 
(2.35)** 
[10.17] 
1.287 
(2.77)*** 
[12.99] 
.858 
(1.88)* 
[8.11] 
.854 
(1.89)* 
[7.94] 
.944 
(2.19)** 
[9.56] 
      Ln(Inf) (-1) .183 
(1.46) 
[1.91] 
.109 
(.82) 
[1.10] 
-.031 
(-.20) 
[-.297] 
-.161 
(-.99) 
[-1.50] 
.135 
(1.03) 
[1.37] 
      TR/Imp (-1) .321 
(2.32)** 
[3.36] 
.331 
(2.38)** 
[3.34] 
.095 
(.63) 
[.889] 
.096 
(.64) 
[.898] 
.238 
(1.64)* 
[2.41] 
      FB/GDP (-1) .004 
(.12) 
[.049] 
-.025 
(-.61) 
[-.259] 
.006 
(.17) 
[.064] 
.0001 
(.003) 
[.001] 
.017 
(.44) 
[.178] 
      GDP (-1) .065 
(1.97)** 
[.684] 
.061 
(1.78)* 
[.621] 
.055 
(1.47) 
[.525] 
.059 
(1.54) 
[.549] 
.058 
(1.69)* 
[.592] 
      %Drawn .030 
(2.57)*** 
[.320] 
.035 
(2.87)*** 
[.361] 
.027 
(2.26)** 
[.257] 
.033 
(2.65)*** 
[.311] 
.029 
(2.42)** 
[.298] 
      IMFp_inf -.720 
(-1.90)* 
[-7.54] 
  
 
 
 
 
 
-.806 
(-2.07)** 
[-8.17] 
      Ap25_inf  
 
 
-1.019 
(-2.87)*** 
[-10.28] 
   
      Time_IMFp_stab  
 
 
 
 
 
.177 
(3.70)*** 
[1.67] 
 
 
 
 
      Time_ap25_stab   
 
 
 
 
 
.218 
(3.92)*** 
[2.02] 
 
 
 
      Dur_inf  
 
 
  
 
 
 .055 
(2.08)** 
[.559] 
            Log Likelihood -60.76 -58.15 -53.81 -52.7 -58.42 
      McFadden R2 .09 .11 .14 .15 .11 
      Observations 308 308 308 308 308 
      
Sources: see Table 3. 
Notes: 
- t-statistics are in parentheses and the marginal effects of the independent variables on the 
probability of starting a stabilization are in brackets; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rej cted: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- models estimated with a constant and 9 country dummies, by Maximum Likelihood (ML); 
- there are 21 Exchange Rate Based Stabilizations in the sample. 
  27 
Table 7: Probit with year dummies 
 1 2 3 4 
     Frag = 1 1.599 
(2.82)*** 
[18.37] 
2.187 
(3.34)*** 
[23.35] 
1.795 
(3.02)*** 
[14.86] 
1.384 
(2.42)** 
[12.02] 
     Frag = 2 1.259 
(2.77)*** 
[14.46] 
1.906 
(3.47)*** 
[20.35] 
1.152 
(2.21)** 
[9.53] 
1.157 
(2.31)** 
[10.05] 
     Ln(Inf) (-1) .399 
(2.79)*** 
[4.59] 
.323 
(2.19)** 
[3.44] 
.041 
(.23) 
[.345] 
-.074 
(-.40) 
[-.650] 
     FB/GDP (-1) .017 
(.43) 
[.203] 
-.056 
(-1.15) 
[-.603] 
-.075 
(-1.40) 
[-.486] 
-.054 
(-1.05) 
[-.472] 
     GDP (-1) .050 
(1.59) 
[.582] 
.037 
(1.08) 
[.403] 
.058 
(1.45) 
[.486] 
.064 
(1.58) 
[.556] 
     %Drawn .023 
(1.99)** 
[.273] 
.029 
(2.36)** 
[.314] 
.036 
(2.37)** 
[.301] 
.046 
(2.85)*** 
[.404] 
     IMFp_inf -1.01 
(-2.62)*** 
[-11.60] 
  
 
 
 
 
 
     Ap25_inf  
 
 
-1.732 
(-3.73)*** 
[-18.48] 
  
     Time_IMFp_stab  
 
 
 
 
 
.710 
(4.95)*** 
[5.88] 
 
 
 
     Time_ap25_stab   
 
 
 
 
 
.578 
(4.66)*** 
[5.02] 
          
          Log Likelihood -64.20 -59.14 -45.78 -47.07 
     McFadden R2 .17 .21 .32 .31 
     Observations 308 308 308 308 
     
Sources: see Table 3. 
Notes:   
- t-statistics are in parentheses and the marginal effects of the independent variables on the 
probability of starting a stabilization are in brackets; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- models estimated with a constant, 9 country dummies and 5 time dummies, by 
Maximum Likelihood (ML). 
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Table 8: Proportional Hazards 
 1 2 3 4 
     Frag = 1 3.46 
(1.78)* 
4.628 
(2.27)** 
3.35 
(2.69)*** 
2.92 
(1.99)** 
     Frag = 2 2.66 
(1.66)* 
3.812 
(2.06)** 
2.33 
(2.12)** 
2.40 
(2.03)** 
     Ln(Inf) (-1) .81 
(2.73)*** 
.607 
(2.18)** 
-.10 
(-.38) 
.-.35 
(-1.11) 
     FB/GDP (-1) .018 
(.18) 
-.168 
(-1.14) 
-.15 
(-1.73)* 
-.12 
(-1.22) 
     GDP (-1) .10 
(1.78)* 
.095 
(1.40) 
.10 
(1.50) 
.14 
(2.10)** 
     %Drawn .03 
(1.73)* 
.047 
(2.04)** 
.06 
(2.57)*** 
.09 
(2.85)*** 
     IMFp_inf -2.23 
(-2.09)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Ap25_inf  
 
-3.659 
(-2.84)*** 
  
 
     Time_IMFp_stab  
 
 
 
1.18 
(4.87)*** 
 
 
     Time_ap25_stab   
 
 
 
1.10 
(3.97)*** 
          Log Likelihood -62.15 -56.67 -44.17 -44.22 
     McFadden R2 .30 .36 .50 .50 
     Observations 308 308 308 308 
     
Sources: see Table 3. 
Notes:  - t-statistics are in parentheses; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 
5%, and *, 10%; 
- models estimated with a constant, 9 country dummies, and 5 time 
dummies, by Maximum Likelihood (ML). 
 
